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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 The United States’ and India’s policies toward Southeast Asia are characterized 
by a significant congruence of interests. This article assesses both the prospects 
and constraints New Delhi and Washington face in coordinating their policies 
toward the region.  
Main Argument  
Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a global 
partnership with the potential to shape the future security architecture of the 
Indo-Pacific. As is widely acknowledged, the two countries’ extraregional interests 
align most closely in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, this article examines the 
potential for and limitations of U.S. and Indian cooperation in the region to achieve 
shared aims. It argues that extensive diplomatic consultations between the two 
countries have led to a significant convergence in their positions on regional 
security challenges. Active cooperation, however, remains constrained by a 
number of factors, including India’s need to prioritize foreign policy challenges 
closer to home, concerns about provoking China, and a discomfort among countries 
in Southeast Asia regarding the idea of a joint U.S.-India approach toward the 
region. Due to these limitations, U.S.-India policies in Southeast Asia are expected 
to operate in parallel instead of becoming a joint endeavor.  
Policy Implications 
• The U.S. and India, which are at the initial stages of a cooperative approach 
to Southeast Asia, should intensify their diplomatic and military exchanges 
and establish a dedicated forum to exchange views and information on 
political and security developments in the region. 
• Strengthening the regional security architecture should be a major focus of 
Indo-U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. In particular, they should concentrate 
on assisting the creation of a region-wide maritime domain awareness 
system, as well as work in parallel to develop the capacity of partner 
militaries.  
• Connectivity and infrastructure projects should be a renewed focus of 
Indian and U.S. efforts in the region, in partnership with like-minded third 
countries such as Japan.  
  
2 
The transformation in U.S.-India relations from alienation during the Cold 
War to a robust strategic partnership is one of the most significant geopolitical 
development of recent decades. In June 2017, at Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 
first meeting with President Donald Trump, the pair “resolved to expand and 
deepen the strategic partnership between the two countries and advance common 
objectives,” most notably “promoting stability across the Indo-Pacific region.”1 
How likely is it that these two countries can actually cooperate and where is such 
cooperation most likely to happen? Across the subregions of the Indo-Pacific, 
Southeast Asia would appear to be an area where the transformation of Indo-U.S. 
strategic ties would have the most significant implications. For India, Southeast 
Asia is the most geographically proximate subregion and the focus of its efforts to 
both “Look East” and “Act East.” For the United States, Southeast Asia 
historically has been a region where Washington’s attention has ebbed and 
flowed.2 Under the Obama administration, however, both individual Southeast 
Asian nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole 
received enhanced attention at the highest levels.  
A decade ago, the idea of the United States and India working together in 
Southeast Asia would have appeared farfetched. Due to a growing recognition of a 
congruence of interests in the region, however, the two countries are increasingly 
articulating common diplomatic positions on key security challenges. Most 
                                                             
1 Ministry of External Affairs (India), “U.S. India Joint Statement: Prosperity through 
Partnership,” June 27, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/28560/Joint_Statement__United_States_and_India_Prosperity_Through_P
artnership.  
2 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Ambivalent Engagement: The United States and Regional Security in 
Southeast Asia after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017). 
3 
prominently, the joint statement made after the Modi-Trump summit in 2017 
addressed the maritime disputes in the South China Sea and reiterated “the 
importance of respecting freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce 
throughout the region.”3 This high profile diplomatic signal had been anticipated 
by some analysts who have long speculated about the close fit between the U.S. 
“rebalance” to Asia and India’s “Act East” policy.4 Indeed, according to former U.S. 
defense secretary Ashton Carter, the United States focusing westwards and India 
acting to its east has resulted in a “strategic handshake” between the two nations 
and represents a “broad convergence of geopolitical interests” between the Indian 
and U.S. strategies.5 
In particular, U.S. officials have been unusually vocal about the natural 
congruence between these two policies. In 2010, then assistant secretary of state 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell argued that the United States is 
“strongly supportive of India playing a major role in the new architecture of the 
Asia-Pacific region.”6 Two years later, defense secretary Leon Panetta echoed this 
                                                             
3 Ministry of External Affairs (India), “U.S. India Joint Statement: Prosperity through 
Partnership”; and Elizabeth Roche, “Modi-Trump Statement Shows Convergence of Views on 
China,” Live Mint, July 3, 2017, 
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/uBMwxBxa0VhuhQTnuNCqSP/ModiTrump-statement-
shows-convergence-of-views-on-China.html.  
4 Michael Kugelman and Raymond E. Vickery Jr., “From ‘Looking’ East to ‘Acting’ East: India’s 
Own Pivot to Asia,” The Diplomat, October 10, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/from-
looking-east-to-acting-east-indias-own-pivot-to-asia/.  
5 Jeff M. Smith, “Assessing U.S.-India Relations: The Strategic Handshake,” The Diplomat, 
September 16, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/assessing-us-india-relations-the-
strategic-handshake/.  
6 Robyn Meredith, “America’s Approach to Asia,” Forbes, April 27, 2010, 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/27/asia-united-states-kurt-campbell-opinions-columnists-robyn-
meredith.html.  
4 
view, calling defense cooperation with India the “linchpin” of the U.S. rebalance.7 
Echoing this view, Significant continuities exist on this issue in the Trump 
administration, for example, where secretary of state Rex Tillerson proclaimed in 
2017 that “India and the United States should be in the business of equipping 
other countries to defend their sovereignty, build greater connectivity, and have a 
louder voice in a regional architecture that promotes their interests and develops 
their economies. This is a natural complement to India’s Act East policy.”8 Indian 
officials have reciprocated, echoing the U.S. vision of a “free, open, and inclusive” 
Indo-Pacific—with Southeast Asia at the core—as an objective of regional policy.9 
With officials in both countries noting, in the words of Indian foreign minister 
Sushma Swaraj, “a growing convergence of views between our countries, among 
others, on the Indo-Pacific,” two key questions emerge Is the idea of a so-called 
natural fit between U.S. and Indian policies in Southeast Asia exaggerated? What 
are the practical limits to Indo-U.S. cooperation in the region?  
In examining these questions, this article makes the following arguments. 
First, a convergence of interests is pushing the United States and India toward 
closer cooperation in Southeast Asia. For the time being, however, diplomatic 
consultations have yet to translate to operational policy coordination. Second, a 
                                                             
7 Leon E. Panetta, “Partners in the 21st Century,” June 6, 2012, available from Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), IDSA Key Speeches, 
http://www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury.  
8 Rex Tillerson, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, October 18, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-
our-relationship-india-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson.  
9 Sushma Swaraj, “Press Remarks on India-U.S. 2+2 Dialogue,” Ministry of External Relations 
(India), September 6, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/30357/EAMs+Press+Remarks+on+IndiaUS+2432+Dialogue.  
5 
deepening of substantive cooperation between the two countries is constrained by 
a number of factors, including India’s need to prioritize foreign policy challenges 
in its immediate region, concerns about provoking China, and a discomfort among 
countries in Southeast Asia with the idea of a joint U.S.-India approach to the 
region. Due to these limitations, U.S. and Indian policies in Southeast Asia are 
likely to continue to operate in parallel instead of becoming a true joint effort.  
This topic is important for two reasons. First, Southeast Asia represents the 
most likely region for U.S.-Indian cooperation as there are no fundamental 
disagreements in either country’s policy objectives. This is in sharp contrast to 
other parts of the world, such as the Middle East or Central Asia, where the two 
states have differing perspectives on Iran, Russia, dialogue with the Taliban, and 
a host of other issues. Consequently, Southeast Asia represents an ideal case study 
to begin to evaluate the potential and limitations of a U.S.-India “global 
partnership.” 10 Second, as noted previously, a number of analysts and 
policymakers assume that there is a natural fit between Indian and U.S. regional 
policies. This article explicitly evaluates those assumptions, probing both the 
potential and limits of bilateral cooperation. This essay proceeds as follows:  
• pp. XX–XX discusses the potential for the U.S. and India to cooperate in 
a different region.  
• pp. XX–XX provide an overview of the United States’ and India’s 
interests and policies toward Southeast Asia.  
                                                             
10 The logic being that if the partnership cannot work here, it is unlikely to work elsewhere.  On 
most-likely case design, see Jack S. Levy, “Qualitative Methods in International Relations,” in 
Millennial Reflections on International Studies, M. Brecher and F. P. Harvey, eds. (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002) p. 442.  
 
6 
• pp. XX–XX examine the convergence of interests between the two states 
and describe the manner in which they are working together.  
• pp. XX–XX identify the limits to their cooperation.  
• pp. XX–XX offer recommendations on strengthening Indo-U.S. 
cooperation in Southeast Asia and a brief conclusion.  
Cooperation in a Distant Land: The U.S. and India in Southeast Asia 
As noted in the introductory essay, there are three main motives for 
extraregional powers to cooperate in a different part of the world: (1) to prevent 
conflict escalation, (2) to work against an indigenous hostile regime, and (3) to 
jointly resist a third state’s actions in the region. In the case of Southeast Asia, 
the chances of interstate war are remote, the United States and India do not 
oppose any of the existing regimes, and, to varying degrees, are comfortable with 
the regional political leaders. Instead, their main motivation to work together is 
to prevent the region from being dominated by a single hegemonic power.11 
Although countries in Southeast Asia wish to avoid being caught up in it, the 
region is an emerging theater for great-power rivalry in Asia.  
What sort of evidence would indicate a joint or convergent approach to a 
region by extraregional powers? First, one would expect to see an 
institutionalization of diplomatic talks and regular exchanges on developments in 
the region. As part of this, one would also find evidence of prior consultation before 
major diplomatic events. Second, regular military staff talks and bilateral visits 
to exchange views and perspectives on the region would occur on a consistent 
                                                             
11 A similar aim is professed by other extraregional powers such as Australia and Japan. 
7 
basis. If the partnership is at an advanced stage, then joint military exercises 
might also occur in the region. Finally, if there are economic complementarities, 
then one might expect to see close consultations on regional economic 
developments.  
As explained later, the United States and India have regular diplomatic talks 
and exchanges of views with respect to Southeast Asia in various forums. Their 
militaries have regular staff talks and make frequent visits. The Indian and U.S. 
navies have engaged in some exercises in Southeast Asia, such as the Indonesian-
led Komodo naval exercises, which focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief.  They have also exercised with Southeast Asian partners outside of the 
region, such as Singapore’s participation in the 2007 Malabar naval maneuvers.. 
Moreover, the two states’ militaries have participated in multilateral exercises 
under the ASEAN Defence Minsters’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) initiative. 
Finally, the U.S. and India have each independently articulated the need to 
enhance connectivity, especially between South and Southeast Asia. The two 
countries are increasingly speaking in the same language while expressing their 
apprehensions regarding the China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the threat that 
Beijing’s debt-trap diplomacy could pose to the autonomy of small states.12 In sum, 
there is growing evidence that Washington and New Delhi are converging with 
respect to their Southeast Asia policies. To understand where these convergences 
are happening, it is first necessary to understand the two countries’ policies 
toward the region.  
                                                             
12 For a U.S. view, see Alex N. Wong, “Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” U.S. Department of 
State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, April 2, 2018, 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm.  
8 
U.S. Interests and Policies toward Southeast Asia 
For much of the last century, U.S. policymakers have tended to see Southeast 
Asia as a vital conduit for pan-Asian trade, a font of economic opportunity, and a 
source of abundant natural resources that could alter the balance of power in East 
Asia if they fell into the wrong hands.13 From a historical standpoint, U.S. policy 
toward Southeast Asia has largely been reactive and shaped in key ways by the 
state of relations with other major powers, be it Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet 
Union and China during the Cold War, or China alone today. Consequently, 
Southeast Asia itself is often seen as an afterthought in U.S. Asia policy, leading 
critics to allege that an inattentive Washington has repeatedly failed to identify 
its priorities there and instead been forced to improvise policies in response to 
crises of the moment rather than adhere to a coherent strategy.14 With Southeast 
Asia at the heart of the rebalance strategy, the Obama administration may have 
been an interlude in this traditional pattern. The significant time and personal 
attention that President Obama devoted to the countries of the region, however, 
has not led to a permanent change. Rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade 
negotiations within days of taking office, the Trump administration undercut U.S. 
claims to economic leadership in Asia and renewed concerns about the U.S. 
commitment to the region and its reliability as a partner.15 For their part, many 
                                                             
13 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the 
Cold War, 1945–48,” American Historical Review 89, no. 2 (1984): 359. 
14 Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement 
after Years of Benign Neglect,” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 622–41. 
15 Joseph Chinyong Liow, “U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration,” 
Asia Policy, no. 24 (July 2017): 57. 
9 
states in Southeast Asia remain unconvinced that the region plays a central role 
in the new administration’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, leading them to 
seek partnerships with countries such as Japan, India, and Australia. 
Contemporary U.S. interests in Southeast Asia remain in line with their 
historical antecedents. The region continues to be a vital transit corridor 
connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. Two-thirds of the world’s oil and nearly 
$5 trillion in goods pass through the waterways of Southeast Asia on an annual 
basis. The same sea lanes are also used by the U.S. Navy and other militaries to 
project power around the globe. In the economic sphere, the United States is 
already the main source of foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia by a 
substantial margin.16 With a collective middle class that is roughly the size of the 
entire U.S. population,  Southeast Asia is likely to grow in importance for the 
United States as a market for both investment and as exports. Indeed, with China 
appearing to enter into a protracted period of economic slowdown, Southeast Asia 
could re-emerge as a key driver of the global economy. In the security realm, 
Washington is still averse to seeing the region fall under the sway of a hostile 
power. In the recent past, Southeast Asia has been an important outpost for 
groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Given that 
many security challenges in Southeast Asia are emerging from within states, 
rather than between them, the United States is interested in containing the 
spread of violent extremism. Washington is also concerned about mitigating any 
potential political volatility triggered by China’s rise. The ultimate aim of U.S. 
                                                             
16 David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive 
Coexistence?” International Security 42, no. 4 (2018): 106. 
10 
regional policy is to see the emergence of a stable and peaceful Southeast Asia 
where the centuries-old principle of the freedom of the seas is sustained and 
existing territorial disputes are resolved lawfully and without coercion. 
India’s Act East Policy 
In 2018, on the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN dialogue partnership, 
Prime Minister Modi took the unprecedented step of inviting all ten regional 
leaders to be the guests of honor at India’s Republic Day parade. Southeast Asia 
has been an important element in India’s global diplomacy ever since the 
government of P.V. Narasimha Rao initiated its Look East policy in 1991. Now 
known as Act East under the Modi administration, this policy has consistently 
sought to bolster economic ties and strategic linkages with countries of East Asia 
in general and Southeast Asia in particular.17  
The first factor driving India’s interest in Southeast Asia is the potential 
opportunities the region offers for India’s socio-economic development. ASEAN is 
India’s fourth largest trading partner (after China, the United States, and the 
United Arab Emirates)—with bilateral trade exceeding $70 billion—as well as a 
                                                             
17 Apart from Southeast Asia, India’s Act East policy includes relations with Japan, Korea, and 
Australia. See “Act East Policy,” Ministry of External Affairs (India), Press Information 
Bureau, December 23, 2015, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133837. For 
examples of the vast and growing literature on India’s engagement with Southeast Asia, see 
Amitav Acharya, East of India, South of China: Sino-Indian Encounters in Southeast Asia 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017); Frédéric Grare, India Turns East: International 
Engagement and U.S.-China Rivalry (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Isabelle de 
Saint-Mezard, “India and Southeast Asia: Whither India’s Strategic Engagements with 
ASEAN?” in Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947, ed. Sumit Ganguly (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016), 326–51; and Rouble Sharma, Dynamics of Cooperation 
between India-ASEAN since 2000 (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2015).  
11 
significant source of FDI.18 Infrastructure and  digital connectivity is an important 
aspect of these relations. Many in India argue that the best way to address the 
endemic poverty and underdevelopment of the country’s northeastern states is to 
enhance their ties—geographic, economic and cultural—with neighboring 
countries in Southeast Asia.19  
The second reason the region garners India’s attention is the diplomatic and 
strategic advantages that Southeast Asia offers. In contrast to Beijing, New Delhi 
has gained considerable diplomatic mileage with its peaceful engagement of both 
ASEAN and individual Southeast Asian states. For their part, Southeast Asian 
countries have welcomed security cooperation with India, especially in the naval 
domain, as the presence of multiple major powers in the region reduces the 
likelihood that any single one could dominate.20 The recognition that India has a 
legitimate role to play in the region has, in turn, helped build up New Delhi’s 
status as a major power in Asia.21 Finally, in so far as India’s Act East policy is in 
                                                             
18 Ministry of External Relations (India), “ASEAN-India Relations,” 
http://mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm.  
19 Press Trust of India, “Act East: Centre Plans to Link North East India to South East Asia, 
Says Assam Governor Jagdish Mukhi,” Indian Express, November 26, 2017, 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/act-east-centre-plans-to-link-north-east-india-to-south-
east-asia-says-assam-governor-jagdish-mukhi-4955476/.  
20 Walter C. Ladwig III, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, ‘Look East,’ and India’s 
Emerging Role in the Asia-Pacific,” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 94–95; C. Raja Mohan, 
Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 94–108. 
21 The transformation in U.S.-India relations played a key role in facilitating Southeast Asian 
acceptance of India as an extraregional actor. 
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part a response to China’s growing influence in Asia, and an active presence in 
Southeast Asia gives India some leverage vis-à-vis its relationship with China.22  
Working Together: The Convergence of Interests 
Despite occasional disagreements—primarily over engagement with the 
military junta in Myanmar—there is a broad convergence of Indo-U.S. diplomatic 
positions in Southeast Asia. As recognition of the range of shared objectives has 
become clearer, Indian strategists have called for a deepening of bilateral ties, both 
as a response to the aggressive rise of China and to further India’s interests. 
Describing the structural factors pushing the two countries together, Rajesh 
Rajagopalan has argued that  
China’s rise and aggressive behavior, coupled with the massive imbalance of 
power between China and India, leaves India with little choice but to attempt 
to balance China….Though the United States can probably still counter China 
by itself, it would be a lot easier to do this in concert with other Asian powers 
such as India. This strategic picture suggests significant promise for U.S.-India 
relations in the longer term.23  
To be fair, there are some Indian pundits and commentators who caution 
against growing ties with United States. These skeptics raise concerns about U.S. 
reliability and trustworthiness or express ideologically-rooted suspicion of 
                                                             
22 Tan Tai Yong, “India-ASEAN Relations at Seventy,” in Seven Decades of Independent India: 
Ideas and Reflections, ed. Vinod Rai and Amitendu Palit (New Delhi: Penguin India, 2018), 55. 
23 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “U.S.-India Relations under President Trump: Promise and Peril, Asia 
Policy,” Asia Policy, no. 24 (2017): 39. See also Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, “Indo-U.S. 
Relations under Modi: The Strategic Logic Underlying the Embrace,” International Affairs 93, 
no. 1 (2017); 141–45; and Dhruva Jaishankar, “India and the United States in the Trump Era: 
Re-Evaluating Bilateral and Global Relations,” Brookings Institution, Brookings Policy Paper, 
no. 37, June 2017, 12–13, 20–21.  
13 
American intentions.24 These minority views, however, are increasingly out of step 
with both mainstream public opinion and the policy of successive governments, 
which have favored closer ties with the United States. The Naresh Chandra 
Committee, established in 2012 to evaluate India’s internal and external 
challenges, for example,  forthrightly argued that  
the growing strategic partnership with the U.S., based on a convergence of 
interests, especially in the Asia Pacific region (including the Indian Ocean), 
offer opportunities for strengthening our national security capacity and 
capabilities, shape the global security architecture and seek greater U.S. 
coordination with us.25 
In sum, there is a growing consensus, both within the Indian government and in 
the broader strategic community that partnering with the United States in the 
Asia-Pacific is a logical long-term strategy for India.26  
Such sentiments are mirrored by U.S. assessments. According to a recent 
RAND study, for example,  
At the regional level, the two nations share fundamental goals including Indo-
Pacific stability; secure shipping through the Malacca Straits; increased land, 
sea, and air connectivity infrastructure; and peaceful settlement of territorial 
                                                             
24 M.K. Bhadrakumar, “For Modi’s India, 2+2=0 as Trump Tightens the Leash,” South China 
Morning Post, September 7, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/geopolitics/article/2163310/modis-india-220-trump-tightens-leash; and Bharat Karnad, 
“New Delhi Must Reset Its Overt Tilt to the U.S.,” Hindustan Times, July 17, 2018, 
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/new-delhi-must-reset-its-overt-tilt-to-the-us/story-
T0Tc65MTTtLY4dVoOLrkqI.html. 
25 National Security Council Secretariat (India), Report of the Task Force on National Security 
(New Delhi, 2012), section 2.31, 10. (Otherwise known as the Naresh Chandra Committee 
Report.)  
26 For example, see Samir Saran and S. Paul Kapur, How India and the US can lead in the Indo-
Pacific, The Interpreter, August 18, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-
india-and-us-can-lead-indo-pacific; Indrani Bagchi, “Two plus two tango: Despite President 
Trump’s hollering, US-India ties have actually thrived on his watch,” The Times of India, 
September 10, 2018;   Joint Task Force Report,  The United States and India: Forging an 
Indispensable Democratic Partnership (Washington DC: Center for American Progress, January 
2018);  Abhijit Singh, et. al, The New India-US Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Peace, Prosperity 
and Security (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2018); Gautam Banerjee, “US-India 2 
Plus 2 Dialogue: Significance of Strategic Partnership,” (New Delhi: Vivekananda International 
Foundation, 2018). 
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disputes. At the country level, they share the goals of encouraging Myanmar’s 
democratic transition; containing radicalism in Indonesia and Malaysia; 
increasing Vietnam’s external engagement; and ensuring that Thailand, 
Singapore, and the Philippines maintain their traditional relationships.27  
As in India, these assessments from the strategic community reflect official 
thinking. In 2013, the U.S. national security adviser, Thomas Donilon, directly 
addressed the synergies between the two nation’s policies, noting that “U.S. and 
Indian interests powerfully converge in the Asia-Pacific, where India has much to 
give and much to gain. Southeast Asia begins in Northeast India, and we welcome 
India’s efforts to ‘look East,’ from supporting reforms in Burma to trilateral 
cooperation with Japan to promoting maritime security.”28 The Trump 
administration’s first National Security Strategy, issued in December 2017, 
offered a similar perspective, welcoming “India’s emergence as a leading global 
power and stronger strategic and defense partner,” in the Indo-Pacific and 
pledging to “support India’s growing relationships throughout the region.”29  
Diplomatic Interests 
Perhaps for the first time, the United States and India are in a position 
wherein they agree on most issues pertaining to Southeast Asia. As a result, their 
diplomats are increasingly speaking the same language. Most significantly, the 
                                                             
27 Jonah Blank, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Angel Rabasa, and Bonny Lin, Look East, Cross Black 
Waters: India’s Interest in Southeast Asia (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), xv-xvi. 
28 Tom Donilon, “Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: ‘The 
United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,’” Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-
national-security-advisor-president-united-states-an. 
29 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C., 
2017), 46–47, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf.  
15 
September 2014 joint statement by then President Barack Obama and Prime 
Minister Modi referred directly to tensions in Southeast Asia and stated that:  
The leaders expressed concern about rising tensions over maritime territorial 
disputes, and affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and 
ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, 
especially in the South China Sea. The Prime Minister and President called on 
all parties to avoid the use, or threat of use, of force in advancing their 
claims…[and] urged the concerned parties to pursue resolution of their 
territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance 
with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.30 
These same themes were repeated in the communique issued after Modi’s 
June 2017 visit to Washington, with the added note that “as responsible stewards 
in the Indo-Pacific region, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi agreed that 
a close partnership between the United States and India is central to peace and 
stability in the region.”31 
Such high-profile diplomatic signaling is the result of repeated deliberations 
between policy-makers in both countries who have, over the years, engaged in an 
unprecedented level of discussion about the Asia-Pacific region. Though prior 
consultations have occurred sporadically, since the start of the East Asia Dialogue 
in 2010 the two sides have had an extant forum for regular, high-level discussions 
about developments in East and Southeast Asia. According to a former U.S. official 
who participated in these bilateral exchanges, the consultations involved a variety 
of activities ranging from “how to coordinate policies in multilateral forums” to 
“exchanging views about the rise of China and maritime disputes in the South 
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China Sea.”32 In 2016 the two countries also initiated a maritime security 
dialogue—which served as an additional forum for exchanging views on Asia-
Pacific maritime developments—at the assistant secretary/joint secretary level.33 
Both sides, however, are quick to point out that these talks are not aimed at any 
third country. According to an unnamed U.S. participant, “we all want to work 
together in concert to ensure rules-based arbitration of international disputes…No 
one is isolating anyone. There is no containment taking place here. This is about 
constructive engagement all around the region.”34 Such remarks eschewing any 
intention to “contain” a third power were aimed at reassuring China about the 
benign nature of these dialogues.  
With changes in governments in both New Delhi and Washington in 2015–
16, some of these initiatives fell by the wayside. Reflecting turbulence in staffing 
and the general policy uncertainty in the early months of the Trump 
administration, for a time there were just sporadic consultations between the two 
bureaucracies. More recently, however, the Trump administration has taken a 
different approach to U.S.-India relations than its predecessor. Under the Obama 
administration, there were roughly 30 bilateral dialogues between the two states 
covering a range of topics. To some critics, this amounted to little more than an 
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endless series of “talk about talks” that achieved few substantial outcomes. The 
Trump administration, in contrast, signaled a desire to focus on only a few, select 
issue areas. Accordingly, in August 2017, Trump and Modi, announced a “2+2” 
ministerial dialogue involving just the foreign and defense ministries “in a bid to 
shift bilateral ties to a higher strategic plane.”35 In the first iteration of the 2+2, 
held in September 2018, the two sides concluded the long-pending 
Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement that will allowing their 
militaries to share data in real time via specialized secure communications 
systems rather than the commercial hardware India currently uses. From a 
diplomatic perspective, what was more significant was the language in the joint 
statement issued at the meeting, which argued that both countries are “committed 
to work together and in concert with other partners toward advancing a free, open, 
and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, based on recognition of ASEAN centrality and 
on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, rule of law, good governance, free 
and fair trade, and freedom of navigation and overflight.”36  Such strong 
diplomatic language alluding to China’s expansive territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, unfair trade practices and efforts to undermine ASEAN clearly 
indicates shared interests and concerns in both New Delhi and Washington.   
                                                             
35 Elizabeth Roche, “New Dialogue Format to Help Shift India-U.S. Ties to a Higher Plane,” Live 
Mint, August 18, 2017, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hrsSAywXTBqsuGD2uzn7TO/New-
dialogue-format-to-help-shift-IndiaUS.html. See also Dhruva Jaishankar, “2+ 2 Delay Does 
Not Mean India-U.S. Ties Are in Trouble,” NDTV News, June 29, 2018, 
https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/5-facts-that-prove-india-us-defence-ties-are-growing-1874850.  
36 Ministry of External Affairs (India), “Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-U.S 2+2 
Ministerial Dialogue,” September 6, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/30358/Joint_Statement_on_the_Inaugural_IndiaUS_2432_Ministerial_Dial
ogue.   
18 
Security Interests 
In the security realm, the United States and India have rarely cooperated 
directly in Southeast Asia.37 Driven by convergent regional goals, however, the 
two countries are working in parallel to support the armed forces of partner 
states.38 In undertaking these efforts, both countries are pursuing a common aim: 
to enhance the capacity of, and foster friendly ties with, regional militaries. This 
is best exemplified in the case of Singapore, which has extensive defense ties with 
both Washington and New Delhi. The United States’ long-standing military 
cooperation with Singapore allows the U.S. Navy to base a logistical unit on the 
island and to operate resupply vessels from its ports, as well as position U.S. naval 
vessels there on a rotational basis. The U.S. frequently deploys ships and planes 
to the city state, and the armed forces of the two countries undertake a range of 
bilateral and multilateral exercises.39 Recently, India has taken its naval 
cooperation with Singapore to another level with the signing of the India-
Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation in November 2017. This 
agreement allows Indian naval ships to be replenished at Changi Naval Base and 
thereby operate for longer periods in the South China Sea.  
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Beyond Singapore, both New Delhi and Washington are deepening defense 
ties with other countries in Southeast Asia, with varying degree of success.40 In 
2016, India and Vietnam upgraded their relationship to that of a comprehensive 
strategic partnership, and New Delhi offered Hanoi $500 million in credit to fund 
the modernization and expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces.41 In an 
important effort to help Vietnam develop the ability to protect its territory, the 
Indian Navy has trained its Vietnamese counterparts to operate advanced Kilo-
class submarines that Hanoi acquired from Russia. The Indian Air Force has 
offered similar instruction for Vietnamese pilots in operating the Russian-built 
Sukhoi Su-30 multirole fighter. In January 2018, the two armies held their first 
joint exercise in India and, more recently, in May 2018, three ships from the Indian 
navy held joint maneuvers with their Vietnamese counterparts in the South China 
Sea for the first time.42 The United States and Vietnam are also slowly reaching 
out to one another. In 2016, the Obama administration lifted a fifty-year-old arms 
embargo on Vietnam. This followed efforts to forge a bilateral security 
relationship, including the establishment of a regular forum for direct military-to-
military talks and the initiation of joint noncombat naval exercises. In January 
                                                             
40 For more on India’s defense ties with ASEAN countries see Ladwig, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition,” 
96-98. For views on U.S. ties with the region see Donald E. Weatherbee, “Political Change in 
Southeast Asia: Challenges for U.S. Strategy,” in Strategic Asia 2007–08: Domestic Political 
Change and Grand Strategy, ed. Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2007), 235–65; and Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia.”  
41 “India, Vietnam Sign Defense Agreements to Counter China,” NDTV.com, September 3, 2016, 
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-vietnam-sign-defense-agreements-to-counter-china-
1454059; and Harsh V. Pant, “India and Vietnam: A “Strategic Partnership” in the Making,” S. 
Rajarathnam School of International Studies (RSIS), RSIS Policy Brief, April 2018.  
42 Raju Gopalakrishnan, “India is Pushing to Be a Bigger Player in Southeast Asia, and It’s a 
Clear Challenge to China,” Business Insider, June 3, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-
with-ports-ships-and-promises-india-asserts-role-in-southeast-asia-2018-6/?IR=T.  
20 
2018, a U.S. aircraft carrier made a port call to Da Nang for the first time since 
the end of the Vietnam War. . The U.S. military has also transferred a dozen patrol 
boats and a secretary-class cutter to the Vietnam Coast Guard. Recently enacted 
U.S. sanctions on countries purchasing arms from Russia poses a challenge to 
deepening military cooperation with Hanoi.43 Nevertheless, if Vietnam continues 
to feel threatened by China, it is possible that it will strengthen its defense 
relations with both India and the United States.  
With the rest of the ASEAN countries, both India and the U.S. have had 
varying levels of success in developing defense relationships. Ristian Atriandi 
Supriyanto classifies India’s defense cooperation with the ten ASEAN states into 
three categories: probing, developmental, and advanced.44 According to this 
framework, India is at an early stage of defense cooperation, probing, with five of 
the ten: Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, and Timor Leste. Defense ties 
are somewhat closer, classified as developmental, with four other countries: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Only Singapore can be classified at 
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an advanced stage since both countries hold regular dialogues and have signed 
numerous defense cooperation agreements.45  
The United States retains a robust program of military exchanges, defense 
sales, and joint training programs with the majority of Southeast Asian states.46 
Malaysia was one of the emerging partners embraced by the Obama 
administration as part of its rebalance strategy and Washington has a healthy 
security relationship with Kuala Lumpur, although it is purposefully downplayed 
due to domestic sensitivities in the Muslim-majority nation.. The Malaysian 
military sends dozens of officers annually to professional education programs in 
the United States, the two countries’ armies and navies regularly conduct bilateral 
and multilateral military exercises, and the U.S. Navy visits Malaysian ports for 
resupply and maintenance. Washington was able to cultivate warm ties with 
Kuala Lumpur under the Najib Razak government, which prioritized good 
relations with United States, however, the return to power of Mahathir 
Mohamad—a vocal opponent of including outside powers such as the United 
States and Australia in pan-Asian regional groupings—raises questions for the 
future. 
A treaty ally of United States, the Philippines is the largest recipient of U.S. 
foreign military assistance in the region. The U.S. aim is to help the Philippine 
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Armed Forces reorient from domestic security to external threats, as well as to 
enhance their ability to monitor their extensive maritime territory. Although the 
U.S. military no longer maintains permanent bases in the islands, U.S. 
aircraft,ships, and soldiers operate from a country an a rotational basis. Despite 
widespread public support for a close relationship with the United States, U.S.-
Philippine relations hit a rough patch during the early years of the Duterte 
administration. In recent months, however, bilateral relations appear to be on an 
upswing, as Philippine president appears to have found a kindred spirit in Trump.  
Although neither U.S. nor Indian officials publicly admit it, the main 
intention behind these endeavors is to show their presence in the region, both to 
reassure partners and to provide a degree of balance against China’s growing 
influence. While doing so, they are also sending a signal that they attach 
importance to the freedom of navigation and the freedom of the seas. There is little 
evidence, though, of any direct coordination between the Indian and U.S. 
militaries in these activities in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the 
transformation in U.S.-India ties—particularly in their defense relations—has 
resulted in considerable bonhomie between the two militaries. This familiarity and 
the intense dialogues accruing from frequent interactions has resulted in greater 
bilateral discussions about regional and extra-regional affairs. According to a 
senior U.S. official, both countries have identified two avenues for future 
cooperation that are pertinent to Southeast Asia: maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) and capacity-building in partner countries.47 The latter suggests that, in 
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the future, the United States and India may actively coordinate their efforts to 
enhance the capacity of partner militaries in the region.  
Economic Interests  
In terms of regional economic policy, the United States and India are 
committed to the connectivity strategy linking South and Southeast Asia. This 
approach is based on the premise that joining these two regions through an 
economic and infrastructure corridor is in the interests of both India and the 
United States. India’s development agenda would be facilitated by physically 
linking its poverty-stricken northeastern region to one of the fastest growing set 
of economies in the world. Such connections would also allow India to assume a 
more central position in Asia’s economic architecture, which would in turn 
contribute to enhancing the prosperity and security of the continent. In this vein, 
in 2011, then prime minister Manmohan Singh declared physical connectivity 
between India and ASEAN to be a “strategic objective”.48 Echoing a similar view, 
U.S. State Department officials have argued that connecting the two regions will 
enhance security and prosperity in Asia—which is in the overall interests of the 
United States.49 This is not just an altruistic endeavor, however, as there is an 
expectation that “additional infrastructure links and better trade relations 
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[between the two regions] would also help unlock and expand existing markets for 
U.S. goods and services.”50  
While enhancing connectivity between these two areas will be beneficial for 
all states in the region, an unstated goal is to create a counterbalance to China. 
Indo-U.S. connectivity projects offer an alternative to Beijing’s efforts to connect 
southern China with Southeast Asia “to advance regional economic integration 
and promote greater economic reliance on China.”51 Owing to China’s economic 
weight and a perception of its growing assertiveness, most ASEAN countries 
welcome a more robust Indian role in the region, even though China’s trade with 
ASEAN is approximately five times that of India.52 Connectivity, therefore, not 
only has an economic but also a geopolitical rationale. Despite shared visions for 
regional economic development, however, as discussed in the next section, there 
are limitations to U.S.-India cooperation in the region.  
Limits to Cooperation 
Despite the positive transformation in bilateral ties and a convergence of 
regional objectives, there are five major constraints to Indo-U.S. cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. First, important policy challenges foreign and domestic, closer to 
home limit India’s ability to play a robust role east of Malacca. Although successive 
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governments have endorsed the Look/Act East policy, the priority for both time 
and resources is necessarily given to the unresolved territorial disputes on India’s 
land borders with Pakistan and China.53 Within the country, armed violence in 
the northeast and Kashmir has at times proven to be beyond the ability of local 
police to contain.54 To guard against Pakistani revisionism and Chinese 
adventurism, as well as support local authorities in domestic contingencies, India 
is compelled to retain a large conventional army that absorbs 55% of the country’s 
defense spending.55 This puts a significant constraint on the growth and 
development of the branch of the armed forces which is most relevant in Southeast 
Asia: the navy.  The Indian Navy has always been the so-called Cinderella service, 
receiving the smallest budgetary allocation of the armed forces.56 Although the 
Indian Navy has embraced the self-designated role as a “net security provider” in 
the Indian Ocean, its focus is more toward the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Bay 
of Bengal—India’s immediate neighborhood—rather than toward Southeast 
Asia.57 Moreover, at present, the navy lacks the capacity to operate effectively in 
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Southeast and East Asia. According to Gurpreet Khurana, in the waters east of 
the Strait of Malacca, “the extended logistic lines and choke-points together pose 
a substantial hindrance for the [navy] to undertake missions across the spectrum 
of conflict.”58 As Chinese influence among the smaller nations of South Asia 
continues to grow, the time and attention of India’s foreign and security policy 
elites will be increasingly devoted to the immediate neighborhood. Southeast Asia 
will have to compete with the Persian Gulf for any diplomatic and military 
resources that remain after attending to issues closer to home. 
A second factor constraining Indo-U.S. cooperation is a fear in New Delhi, 
and to a lesser extent in Washington, that cooperation might adversely affect 
bilateral relations with China. The economies of India, China, and the United 
States are interdependent. Despite some political tensions, all three countries seek 
expanded economic growth, and none explicitly seeks to create an enemy of the 
other. In the recent past, the United States has been more willing than India to 
balance economic cooperation with selected confrontation in its China policy. The 
Obama administration, for example, could negotiate a bilateral investment treaty 
with China while also increasing the pace of freedom of navigation operations in 
the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing’s maritime claims around its artificially 
created land features. Unlike the United States, India shares a disputed land 
border with China. Thus, India has been more sensitive to Beijing’s diplomatic 
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posturing and readiness to take offence at any action perceived to be aimed at 
containing its rise. Although some analysts have exaggerated the substantive 
effect that the so-called Wuhan summit had on Sino-Indian relations in the wake 
of the 2017 Doklam standoff, there has been a clear effort by the Modi 
administration to pause the growing antagonism in the bilateral relationship.59 In 
the near future, India can be expected to continue to carefully adjust its policy in 
Southeast Asia to ensure that it does not negatively affect either its trade 
relationship with China or its own territorial dispute.60 For its part, the United 
States wants the countries of Southeast Asia to be able to defend themselves 
against intimidation and aggression. Despite what Aaron Friedberg terms the 
Trump administration’s “unprecedentedly combative stance towards China,” 
Washington does not want to be drawn into a conflict over a peripheral disputed 
territory where a minor disagreement could become a major war.61 To allay such 
fears and to safeguard their bilateral ties with China, both Washington and New 
Delhi are careful in calibrating their relationship in Southeast Asia.  
Third, there is an important institutional mismatch that prevents greater 
cooperation between the two democracies. The limited capacities of India’s foreign 
and security bureaucracies constrains New Delhi’s ability to play a larger global 
role. These capacity limits exist in two domains: the diplomatic corps and the 
institutional architecture of the defense ministry. Relative to its size, India has a 
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very small foreign service that is quantitatively on par with that of New Zealand 
or Singapore.62 This limits the number of diplomatic functions that can be 
undertaken at any one time and requires the Ministry of External Affairs to 
constantly prioritize competing demands. As India’s prominence on the world 
stage has grown, these demands have only increased over time as more countries 
seek to engage India on a broader range of issues. Individual diplomats must 
constantly pick and choose what tasks to focus on and their ability to take on 
additional responsibilities is limited. Consequently, foreign officials have been 
self-deterred from placing demands on their Indian counterparts out of a fear that 
it might be “overloading the Indian system.”63 This problem not only limits India’s 
functions in existing multilateral meetings but also constrains the government’s 
ability to embrace new diplomatic initiatives and groupings. A similar capacity 
problem also exists in the Ministry of Defense as there is only one joint secretary 
(U.S. assistant secretary equivalent) in charge of international cooperation for the 
entire world. Moreover, the Indian defense ministry does not have a counterpart 
to U.S. offices that are devoted to political-military affairs and regional 
developments. As a result, the strategic dimensions of India’s Act East policy, in 
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terms of military-to-military contacts, exercises, and exchange of views is 
limited.64  
Fourth, in the infrastructure space, India and the United States are not well 
placed to meet Asia’s needs, meaning that Indo-U.S. cooperation on their 
connectivity strategy will neither be easy, nor assured. Like then secretary Hillary 
Clinton’s “New Silk Road” before it, former secretary of state John Kerry’s vision 
of an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor linking South and Southeast Asia in a 
network of trade and physical ties garnered much attention at the time of its 
announcement, but there has been little follow-through.65 Unlike China, the U.S. 
government does not have the ability to direct American firms to undertake 
infrastructure mega-projects or make investments in other parts of the world. To 
its credit, the Trump administration has set aside funds for Indo-Pacific Economic 
Corridor, but the development and success of this initiative remains to be seen.66 
For its part, the Indian government lacks capital and the capacity to implement a 
large-scale infrastructure development program abroad.67 Consequently, for both 
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Washington and New Delhi, enhancing region connectivity will be a slow and 
challenging process.  
Finally, the notion of a joint U.S.-India approach to Southeast Asia raises 
concerns among countries in the region. Unnerved by China’s assertive behavior 
and island-building activities, in recent years Southeast Asian countries have 
generally welcomed a larger role for the United States, India and other 
extraregional powers, such as France, Japan and the EU68 Their diplomatic 
ambitions, however, have been mainly to embed all these powers in various 
multilateral, ASEAN-centric forums. They have welcomed engagement with 
extraregional powers but, importantly, on a bilateral, one-to-one basis. If 
Washington and New Delhi were to jointly approach any of these countries, they 
would likely face opposition out of a fear such actions were explicitly directed 
against China. It is not surprising, therefore, that the countries of Southeast Asia 
are not very keen on supporting the re-emergence of the  Quad—the consultative 
grouping of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia—because they are 
concerned such an assembly will undermine ASEAN centrality. 69  
What Can Be Done? 
If India and the United States wish to enhance their cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, what are the most favorable areas to focus on? As a preliminary step toward 
                                                             
68 For more about hedging and alignment behavior in Southeast Asia, see Shambaugh, “U.S.-
China Rivalry in Southeast Asia,” 93–103. 
69 Joel Ng, “The Quadrilateral Conundrum: Can ASEAN Be Persuaded?” RSIS, RSIS 
Commentary, no. 120, July 17, 2018.  
31 
any meaningful coordination, Washington and New Delhi should set up a 
dedicated forum to exchange views and actively encourage cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. The two states currently have a maritime security dialogue but 
its composition suggests Southeast Asia is not a major area of focus.70  
One promising area to focus on is strengthening the existing regional security 
architecture. In analyzing the U.S. pivot and India’s Act East policy, Sourabh 
Gupta has concluded that the best arena for partnership is in “multilateral 
security constructs that are UN-flagged or come under broad-based umbrellas 
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus,” 
the latter being a meeting of the ASEAN defense ministers and the organization’s 
eight dialogue partners.71 India has traditionally felt comfortable working within 
regional security institutions and has embraced initiatives like the ADMM-Plus, 
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the Information Fusion Centre, which 
focuses on regional maritime information-sharing. Fortunately, there are 
indications that the United States is also increasingly invested in regional 
multilateral forums.72 Therefore, despite the internal divisions plaguing 
ASEAN—it is important for Washington and New Delhi to give attention to 
ASEAN-led regional security initiatives, even if just for symbolic reasons.  
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 Maritime domain awareness (MDA) and maritime capacity-building in 
partner countries is another area for potential cooperation. Both countries are 
currently working on enhancing their shared MDA in the Indian Ocean region, yet 
from the standpoint of real-time situational awareness, many key parts of 
maritime Southeast Asia remain mare incognitum.73 India and the United States 
can help build connections among the various national maritime surveillance 
agencies in the region to create a network that would enhance MDA from the 
Andaman Islands through to the east coast of the Philippines. The United States 
has already contributed some funds to build MDA capacity of Philippines and 
Indonesia and is exploring projects in Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand.74 The 
ultimate aim would be to pool the surveillance capabilities of each state to develop 
a shared awareness of the real-time situation in the air and seas of Southeast Asia. 
There are certainly capacity shortfalls that inhibit MDA in the region, but lack of 
trust among neighbors is also an important obstacle. New Delhi and Washington 
can leverage their existing relationships to bridge some of these gaps. According 
to Admiral Sunil Lanba, India’s chief of naval staff, this is an area of priority for 
the Indian Navy and has already operationalized agreements with a dozen Indian 
Ocean littoral nations to share white shipping information.75 The efficacy of U.S.–
India cooperation on MDA would, of course, be enhanced if India signed the Basic 
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Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence—the final 
outstanding “foundational agreement” that could underpin robust military-to-
military cooperation between the United States and India.76 If such an accord were 
reached, the two partners would be able to exchange geospatial information for 
both civilian and military purposes that would facilitate ocean mapping and other 
maritime monitoring activities. 
A parallel initiative to augmenting MDA would be a coordinated effort to 
enhance the capabilities of regional states to police their own exclusive economic 
zones. Japan is already working to build the capacity of the Philippine and 
Vietnamese coast guards via the transfer of surface vessels and joint training 
exercises, while Australia has provided the Philippine navy with similar 
assistance.77 The United States and India can contribute to these efforts by 
supplying communications and sensor systems that are interoperable with the 
Indian and U.S. Navies to enhance situational awareness. The Indian Navy can 
also be a source of expertise, particularly for countries in which joint training with 
the United States would controversial. Although many of these efforts are already 
underway individually, a coordinated approach would help ensure maximum 
returns to each nation’s endeavor. Prior consultations about security assistance 
priorities in Southeast Asia could help de-conflict, and perhaps even coordinate, 
their efforts.  
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Third, the U.S. and India should re-emphasize enhancing connectivity 
between South and Southeast Asia. The focus should be on implementing existing 
projects, however, rather than proposing increasingly grandiose region-wide 
economic corridors that are never translated into reality. A good starting point is 
the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway, which was first proposed in 2002. A lack 
of financial and institutional support in all three countries led the project to 
languish for years, however the Modi administration has recently declared that it 
will be operational by the end of 2019.78 Ensuring that this project hits its target 
will be key to establishing India’s reputation as a credible partner. On its side, the 
United States can work with countries such as Japan or institutions such as the 
World Bank or the Asian Development Bank to help provide the necessary 
financing for planned extensions of the highway to Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia.79 The United States can also provide funding and expertise for “smart 
logistics” along this trade corridor whereby integrated systems track cargo 
vehicles and transmit customs manifestos, rendering border crossings a seamless 
exercise. 
Counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in Southeast Asia is a final area 
for potential cooperation between the two countries. As with India and the United 
States, all the countries of the region are concerned about ISIS gaining a foothold 
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in Southeast Asia as well as the spread of extremist Salafist ideology in Malaysia, 
Philippines and Indonesia. In recent years, the two partners have intensified their 
bilateral counterterrorism cooperation via joint training and intelligence sharing.   
It could be productive to extend that conversation beyond South Asia to examine 
what both countries can do to prevent radicalization and entrenchment of militant 
groups in Southeast Asia.80 Such efforts could also be expanded to include active 
cooperation with various countries in the region.  
Conclusion: Working Together, But in Parallel 
The transformation in U.S.-Indian relations that has occurred in the past 
fifteen years has resulted in an apparent congruence of interests between the two 
nation’s policies toward the Asia-Pacific broadly and Southeast Asia in particular. 
Taking their cues from increasingly common diplomatic positions on developments 
in the region, a number of analysts have suggested that Indo-U.S. cooperation in 
Southeast Asia is a likely proposition.81 The underlying assumption is that a 
convergence of interests could lead the two countries into a gradual, if unspoken, 
“alliance.”  
Expectations of close Indo-U.S. cooperation in Southeast Asia overlook both 
the limits to their partnership and the constraints on India’s ability to play a 
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significant role east of the Strait of Malacca.82 For these reasons, extensive 
diplomatic consultation and shared assessments of regional security issues have 
not yet led to active cooperation on a policy level. Despite these constraints, 
however, there are still some steps that India and the United States can take to 
better coordinate their policies toward Southeast Asia. Regular diplomatic 
consultations are crucial to this effort and should be prioritized. In addition, both 
countries are working in parallel to build up the militaries of partner states in the 
region. To an extent, their efforts are complementary, as India is able to provide 
training, logistical, and other value-added skills to countries that operate Russian 
military platforms and also can provide low-tech military systems and 
subsystems. Finally, the two countries should work with like-minded ASEAN 
countries to support regional security initiatives and strengthen the twin concepts 
of ASEAN unity and centrality.  
Despite being economically interdependent with China, most Southeast 
Asian states want other major powers to remain engaged in the region to hedge 
against political domination by Beijing.83 The presence of multiple rising powers, 
competing territorial claims, and nationalism means that the region is likely to 
witness a protracted great-power competition for influence.84 Undoubtedly this 
will exacerbate tensions in the U.S.-China and India-China relationships. How 
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these three powers interact with each other will have major consequences for the 
Southeast Asia. For the moment, it appears that U.S. and Indian policies toward 
the region will move in parallel—working independently in pursuit of a common 
goal. It remains to be seen if in response to growing Chinese assertiveness their 
partnership can rise to another level.  
 
